Afghanistan: The future? – Top politicians of India, Latest Indian Political News – Myleaders
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Afghanistan: The future?
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Bangalore, Dec.18 : Pakistan’s Army Chief, General Raheel Sharif recently spent two weeks in the US, an unusually long visit by any standards. During this period, Afghanistan was wracked by violence – a suicide bombing in Paktika which resulted in 80 deaths and 12 consecutive days of terror attacks in Kabul.
How does one view this? To paraphrase Ian Fleming, once is happenstance, twice could be coincidence but more must surely be ascribed to something deliberate and sinister. Is it that the Taliban and their associates are out of control as Amrullah Saleh, the former Afghan intelligence chief, questions in his recent piece in Al Jazeera (Afghans are ready but is Pakistan willing?) ; or is it that there is a ‘rogue’ element in the ISI out to demonstrate that the Pak Army chief’s hold over the military apparatus is not uncontested; a message that an orderly US withdrawal would be well nigh impossible without Pakistani support; a glimpse of Afghanistan’s future if Pakistan chose not to be supportive; or a consequence of President Ghani’s visit where he, in a manner unprecedented, called on the Pak Army chief in his office even before meeting the head of government.
The jury is still out but the fact that two of Pakistan’s strategic assets went into overdrive suggests that their actions were with the acquiescence of Pakistani agencies. The attacks in Kabul revealed a degree of planning, sophistication and the use of advanced explosives not hitherto associated with the Taliban and that in Paktika was a by an organization described by the Americans as an extension of the ISI.
Whatever the motive, something that has emerged as a truism, is that no Afghan leader can veer close to Pakistan. There are limits to this relationship. Pakistan, in its pursuit of a patron-client relationship with Afghanistan, has been responsible for much destruction and unwarranted interference and is capable of inflicting pain even if it has to pay a price. It is a malevolent presence that cannot be wished away.
What then does Pakistan want to rein in its assets and end its interference? – Recognition of the Durand line, an end to the use of Afghan territory as a sanctuary by the Pakistani Taliban and a containment of India. While it is said that Pakistan no longer seeks a Taliban-controlled government in Afghanistan, this shift is not a concession but because it is conscious that the Taliban in Kabul would mean that Mullah Omar and the senior Taliban leadership would need to surface. It is unclear whether Omar, like Osama bin Laden, is under some form of house arrest or alive at all. The bets are with Omar and the senior Taliban leadership breaking free of Pakistani control if permitted to return to Afghanistan.
The minimum, thus, that Pakistan wants is a comfort zone with its ‘strategic assets’ in control of a swath of territory along the Durand Line while continuing to harbor and exercise control over these ‘assets’. This is an implicit recognition that no Afghan leader, not even the Taliban, can concede on the Durand line for that, and its nationalistic implications, is the one key that remains in Afghan hands.
Let no one mistake it, Pakistan has no solutions to offer Afghanistan. The price it is seeking is not realistic – it cannot deliver. It does not have the economic strength to provide Afghanistan any succor, it cannot deliver peace as it is not entirely confident of the assets it spawned and it is abhorred by the bulk of the Afghans, even within the ranks of the Taliban.
It is so heavily dependent on foreign aid that it cannot provide any financial comfort to Afghanistan. It is a state in disarray, in constant danger of imploding and hardly a model worth emulating. It is seeking temporary respite for itself by ridding itself of all its troublemakers and forcing them into Afghanistan. Inevitably, Pakistani restraint on its ‘strategic assets’ will wither and they would no longer be subservient.
The Haqqani network is said to have been responsible for the suicide bombing at Yahya Khel in Paktika which inflicted over 80 fatalities. This clearly indicates that their operational capabilities remain intact despite the much touted Zarb-e-Azb. The Haqqani network and the foreign jehadis have merely dispersed to new sanctuaries, not one Haqqani network leader has been captured and there is no independent corroboration of the terrorists killed or captured as very few journalists have been allowed in.
The Taliban embarked on its new brand of attacks in Kabul that seem to be aimed at undermining the government, despite the fact that the new Afghan President called on the Pak Army chief even before he met his counterpart.
There is also trouble brewing in Kunduz, the home province of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, another of Pakistan’s ‘strategic assets’
All of this is despite General Raheel Sharif’s, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, speech at the Pakistan embassy in Washington DC where he said, “I would like to openly say that this (Operation Zarb-e-Azb) is against all hues and colours, and it is without any exception, whether it is Haqqani network or Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan or anything.” The HN operation in Paktika was just two days later and this by an organization described by Admiral Mike Mullen as the ‘ISI’s veritable arm’.
At a larger level there is simply no evidence that the ISI has given up its plans to subjugate Afghanistan. As former Afghan Minister Abdul Rehman once claimed ‘a country which has seen the lights of Termez flashing in the distance will not rest till they regain that control’. Pakistan will continue with its subterfuges till such time the US troops leave Afghanistan and then it would be business as normal. This intent has already vocalized by National Security Advisor Sartaj Aziz who commented that there was no reason to ‘target those extremists who do not target us…why should we willy-nilly make the US’s enemies our enemies?’
It may well be back to the future.
The views expressed in the above article are that of Mr. Anand Arni. Mr. Arni is associated with the Takshashila Institution. He was formerly a career intelligence officer.

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